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The Tale of Two Harts;
A Schlegelian Dialectic
CHARLES L. BARZUN†
[I]t is simply our total character and personal genius that are on
trial; and if we invoke any so-called philosophy, our choice and use
of that also are but revelations of our individual aptitude or
incapacity for moral life. From this unsparing practical ordeal no
professor’s lectures and no array of books can save us.1
[I]t is only through personal, self-reliant participation, by trial and
error, in the problems of existence, both personal and social, that
the capacity to participate effectively can grow. Man learns wisdom
in choosing by being confronted with choices and by being made
aware that he must abide the consequences of his choice.2
Good lawyers earn the big bucks you all hope to make by putting
their butt on the line, by exercising the best possible judgment in
circumstances where answers are unlikely and advice only possible
in terms of better or worse alternatives.3

†Horace W. Goldsmith Professor of Law, University of Virginia. For helpful
comments and discussions on this and earlier drafts, I’d like to thank Robert
Condlin, Peter Danchin, Neil Duxbury, Hendrik Hartog, Nicola Lacey and the
participants in the legal theory workshop at the University of Maryland Carey
School of Law. And a special thanks to Schlegel for the honesty, humanity, and
humor he has brought to our conversations over two decades of friendship.
1. William James, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, 1 INT’L. J.
ETHICS 330, 354 (1891).
2. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 410 (1958).
3. John Henry Schlegel, To Dress for Dinner: Teaching Law in a
Bureaucratic Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 453 (2018).
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Schlegel once relayed to me, during one of our many long
phone chats over the years, a story about a talk he once
delivered at Yale in the late 1980s. During the Q&A, Owen
Fiss asked him, in a somewhat exasperated tone, “Are you
serious, or is this a joke?” Schlegel thought about the
question for a moment and then responded, “both.” Fiss was
apparently not amused. But I was, by the retelling. This
Essay is not a joke, but it does aim to say something, albeit
indirectly, about the organizing theme of this conference:
“serious fun.”
I say “indirectly” because its more immediate subject
matter is a pair of classic modern legal texts: HLA Hart’s The
Concept of Law and the teaching materials for Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks’s second-year course at Harvard Law
School, The Legal Process.4 These two works are in some
ways quite similar, including, most obviously, that they were
both written for law students at elite universities at roughly
the same time. But I am more interested in the differences
between these works or, perhaps more accurately,
differences between their authors. The differences are both
substantive and methodological, but I will focus on the
methodological difference because I think that it reflects an
even deeper philosophical divide between the two thinkers.
My argument, if you can call it that, consists of several,
related claims. The first thing I hope to show is that the two
Harts—whom I will call Henry and Herbert, for clarity and
simplicity—both were attempting to deal with the same
underlying philosophical dilemma. That dilemma arises
from the apparent incompatibility between our ordinary
experience of meaning and value, on the one hand, and the

4. See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); HENRY M. HART,
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
The course was taught in 1957 and most of the materials in the first chapter
finalized by 1959. It is commonly recognized that the materials mainly reflect
Hart’s intellectual vision and that Sacks was the junior partner. See HART &
SACKS, supra, at lxxvii–lxxxv.
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mechanistic image of the world offered by modern science, on
the other. The two Harts, however, took very different
approaches to dealing with this dilemma, owing largely to
the different philosophical traditions within which each was
working.
My second point is that today we live in Herbert’s world.
That is true not only because his account of the nature of law
remains the dominant one, but also because of a broader
picture of law, and its relation to other disciplines of
knowledge, that it has encouraged. In that picture,
normative and doctrinal forms of scholarship are offered
from an “internal” perspective on law, whereas historians
and the social scientists study law from an “external”
perspective.5 This tacit view of legal practice and theory has
penetrated so deeply and pervasively that we cannot help but
see Henry’s own contributions to legal theory in its terms,
relegating it to the “internal” side of the dichotomy.
For reasons I’ll explain, though, I think Henry himself
would have rejected that interpretation. I thus propose
conducting a thought-experiment that imagines a reversal of
explanatory roles. What if, rather than explaining Henry’s
theory of law in the terms of Herbert’s, we explained
Herbert’s theory of law in terms of Henry’s? More generally,
how would such a picture alter our understanding of how law
as a “discipline” relates to other forms of knowledge?
Answering this last question will bring us back to
Schlegel. I will argue that Schlegel’s thinking about law,
history, and disciplines in general can be seen as part of the
tradition to which Henry, rather than Herbert, belongs. That
may sound counter-intuitive—paradoxical, even—since
Schlegel was himself part of the critical legal studies
5. See generally Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the InternalExternal Distinction in Legal Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 1203 (2015)
[hereinafter Inside-Out]. The current essay draws on, and develops further,
points made in that article as well as those made in Charles L. Barzun, The
Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2013)
[hereinafter Forgotten Foundations].
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movement, one of whose primary targets was the legalprocess approach Henry epitomized. Maybe it is paradoxical,
but no more so than an instruction to have serious fun.
I.
The Concept of Law and The Legal Process are in many
ways quite similar. But there are some critical differences.
The question I’ll raise is, what explains those differences?
The similarities between the two books extend beyond
the primary authors’ last names and the fact that they were
both written for law students. Both works put procedure at
the heart (no pun intended) of law and legal systems. In The
Concept of Law, Herbert argued that the “key to the science
of jurisprudence” was to recognize that what enabled the
concept of “legal validity” to have any meaning was, in part,
the existence of “secondary” or “power-conferring” rules that
offer criteria for establishing which “primary” rules of
conduct qualified as law. Such secondary rules enable courts
and officials to (1) determine which primary rules count as
legal rules, (2) change primary rules through certain
procedures, and (3) apply and enforce the primary rules.
Such secondary rules “remedied” the “defects” of a society
governed exclusively by primary rules of conduct.6
At the same time, in Chapter 1 of the Legal Process
teaching materials, Henry argued for something very
similar. He explained that although people living in society
often have competing interests or “wants,” they all have an
interest in living together in peace. Therefore, they develop
both “substantive arrangements” as to how to allocate
resources and “procedural” or “constitutive” arrangements as
to decide how to create, change, and enforce those
substantive arrangements. Given that such procedural
arrangements are both the source of the substantive
arrangements and the means by which they are applied,

6. See HART, supra note 4, at 91–98.
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procedural arrangements are, in Hart’s word “obviously
more fundamental” than the substantive arrangements.7
Substitute “secondary rules” for “procedural arrangements”
and “primary rules” for “substantive arrangements” and you
have something like Herbert’s rule of recognition.
The striking similarity between these two accounts
corresponds to many similarities in their authors. Henry and
Herbert were born three years apart (1904 and 1907,
respectively), both spent part of their career practicing law,
both participated in the war effort, and both then devoted
themselves to legal teaching and scholarship in what were at
the time their respective homeland’s leading universities,
Harvard and Oxford. The two Harts even spent a year
teaching at the same university, when Herbert visited
Harvard for the 1956-57 academic year—during which time
Henry was working on his teaching materials and Herbert
was working on the book that became The Concept of Law.8
They also shared a broadly similar scholarly agenda.
While at Harvard, Henry and Herbert both participated in a
“Legal Philosophy Discussion Group,” along with Lon Fuller,
Morton White, and others. There they circulated papers
about the nature of courts, rules, discretion and other issues
central to the “rule of law”—a particularly salient concern in
the postwar period.9 In this way, both works could be seen as
“responses” to—because they included criticisms of—legal
realism and its perceived threat to traditional legal values.10
In short, from the perspective of today’s academy—one
more diverse than theirs in so many respects, including those
of race, class, sex, and disciplinary method, among many

7. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 3–4.
8. See NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE
NOBLE DREAM 179, 190 (2004).

OF

H. L. A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE

AND THE

9. See id. at 188. See also Forgotten Foundations, supra note 5, at 51–52.
10. See Forgotten Foundations, supra note 5, at 3–4 (collecting citations to
scholars that have characterized the teaching materials in this way); HART, supra
note 4, at 136–47 (discussing and criticizing the “rule skepticism” of the realists).
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others—the two Harts seem materially indistinguishable.
Both were white, male lawyers of the same generation who
operated within, and at the pinnacle of, a white, male legal
establishment—an establishment which saw itself as
charged with articulating and defending postwar
understandings of democracy and the rule of law.11
Yet in some ways the two Harts’ contributions to legal
thought point in quite different directions, substantively and
methodologically. Let’s take substance first. The two works
seem to reach very different conclusions with respect to one
of the most fundamental questions at stake in any discussion
of the meaning and value of the “rule of law,” namely
whether citizens have a duty to obey the law.
A comparison of two passages from each of their works
conveys the difference well. In the first chapter of the Hart
& Sacks teaching materials, the authors state that the
“central idea of law” is what they call the “principle of
institutional settlement,” according to which each individual
in society has a duty to comply with “decisions which are the
duly arrived at result of duly established procedures . . .
unless and until they are duly changed.”12 The materials
then go on to state that although we say in common speech
that the law “is” such and such, “yet the ‘is’ is not really an
‘is’ but a special kind of ‘ought.’”13 So, for Henry, there is such
a duty.
Compare that passage to one of the more famous
passages in The Concept of Law, where Herbert explains why
it is so important to recognize the independence of law from
morality:
What surely is most needed in order to make men clear-sighted in
confronting the official abuse of power, is that they should preserve
the sense that the certification of something as legally valid is not

11. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 235–45 (1973).
12. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 4.
13. Id. at 5.
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conclusive of the question of obedience, and that, however great the
aura of majesty or authority which the official system may have, its
demands must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny.14

Herbert here rejects the idea that the legal validity of
some directive is sufficient to compel the obedience of those
ruled by it.
Henry and Herbert thus seem to draw nearly opposite
conclusions from almost identical premises. Both see the
existence of law as essentially connected not only to certain
procedures, but to the acceptance of those procedures as the
proper ones for resolving conflicts about the substantive
norms that govern society. But whereas Henry infers from
that fact something like a moral obligation to abide by the
outcomes of such procedures, the lesson Herbert draws is
just the reverse: since the rules validated by those
procedures only count as “legal” because of the mere fact that
they have been accepted by officials in the legal system as
law-validating ones, citizens must subject those rules to
moral scrutiny before assuming that obedience to them is
required.
This contrast prompts a question: why do these two men,
whose scholarly agendas and ideological assumptions are
otherwise so similar, come to such different conclusions
about something as fundamental as the power of law to
morally compel obedience? Answering this question reveals
the second, methodological difference between the two
works.
Herbert’s own theory suggests one explanation. His
advance over John Austin’s form of positivism was achieved
in part by distinguishing between two “points of view” with
respect to what Hart called a “social rule.” Those who view a
rule from the “internal” point of view see the rule as a
standard of evaluation or a justification for complying with
it, whereas those who take the “external” point of view
simply use it to predict how those living under it may behave.
14. HART, supra note 4, at 210.
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For Hart, a legal system required some set of people, possibly
only the “officials” of a legal system, to take the “internal
point of view” of the ultimate rule of recognition.15 From that
perspective (but only from that perspective), the secondary
rules that authorize the promulgation and enforcement of
the primary rules of conduct are seen to be legitimate, or at
least demand (in some normative sense) official compliance.
Thus, Herbert’s theory offers an obvious explanation for
why the Hart & Sacks teaching materials treat the American
legal system as one that compels obedience. Its authors
adopted the “internal point of view” with respect to the
American constitutional order. Henry, after all, assumed
that he was teaching the future legal and political elite of the
country (and so he was—at one point a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court were former students of
Harvard’s Legal Process course16), so it is obvious why he
would be interested in endorsing (we might even say
legitimating) the current legal regime.
That explanation is consistent with how the legalprocess tradition has been treated and understood by legal
philosophers. Hart’s most famous antagonist, Ronald
Dworkin, whose theory of law owes much to the legal-process
school, himself embraced the “internal point of view,” albeit
in slightly modified form.17 In Law’s Empire (1986), Dworkin
announced at the outset that in elaborating his theory of law
he would not take the explanatory perspective of an
“historian or sociologist” but would instead adopt the
“internal point of view” of the judge, who seeks practical
arguments about what to do.18 At the same time, other legal
philosophers have interpreted (charitably, in their view)
15. HART, supra note 4, at 116.
16. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at cxxv.
17. See Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The
Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 413–14 (1987); Forgotten
Foundations, supra note 5, at 29 (observing that “Hart and Sacks seemed to
foreshadow the work of Ronald Dworkin”).
18. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 14 (1986).
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legal-process theorists as adopting something like the
“internal point of view.”19 They were, after all, lawyers, not
sociologists, historians, or philosophers.
Moreover, we legal scholars today still operate according
to the conceptual dichotomy Herbert’s theory of law set in
motion. The distinction between “internal” and “external”
forms of legal scholarship is now entrenched.20 Normative,
interpretive and doctrinal work is characterized as
“internal”—the kind of stuff a practicing lawyer might
conceivably (even if not actually) use—whereas socialscientific, empirical or explanatory work is treated as
“external” scholarship.21 In fact, the dichotomy has become
so entrenched in the legal academy that those who
transgress it are accused of committing a “fallacy.”22
However entrenched the dichotomy may now be, though,
it was not how Henry saw things, at least not as expressed
in the Legal Process materials and much of his other writing.
Far from taking the basic legitimacy of current legal practice
as a starting assumption, the materials try to provide a
quasi-sociological foundation for law by explaining why it
might it have a claim to obedience.23 And far from adopting
the “judge’s” point of view, one of the main tasks of the
materials is to convey to students how differently various
actors within a legal system might look at the same problem.
Consider this passage, which concludes a discussion of “the
nature of institutional decisions”:
Are the positions which have been taken thus far in these
materials conventional and generally accepted? Might a
19. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Fuller’s Internal Point of View, 13 L. & PHIL.
285, 302 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler
Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 972 (1994).
20. Inside-Out, supra note 5, at 1207.
21. See id. at 1207–08.
22. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2013).
23. See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 1; Forgotten Foundations, supra note
5, at 20–21.
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representative chairman of the Republic National Committee, for
example, be expected to agree with them? A chairman of the
Democratic National Committee? A representative union leader? A
representative president of the United States Chamber of
Commerce? Of the American Bar Association? A representative
member of the Soviet Russian Politburo? A younger professor of
anthropology in an American university representative of the most
recent trend of thought in this field? Of economics? History?
Philosophy? Political science? Psychology? Sociology?
Does it make any difference to a hard-headed practicing lawyer
whether the positions are accepted or rejected—or simply ignored?24

This passage hardly suggests a work that adopts the
judge’s, lawyer’s, or any other “internal” point of view. Far
from shutting off other disciplinary perspectives on
commonly held legal assumptions, the materials explicitly
invite comparison to them. Indeed, the “hard-headed
practicing lawyer” is only introduced as a skeptic of the entire
enterprise, not as its personification.25 Rather, what the
materials encourage students to develop was an
“Olympian”—one might even say a philosophical—
perspective on law.26
It may appear that I have sought to liberate Henry’s
ambitions from shackles of Herbert’s internal/external pointof-view dichotomy only at the cost of ascribing to him an
unattractive and unjustified lawyerly arrogance. Even
putting aside the impossibility of ever attaining a “neutral”
or “Olympian” perspective on political and legal questions,27
24. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 113.
25. In notes for an unpublished lecture, Hart described Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s skeptical, predictive approach to law as “hard-headed.” See Henry Hart,
The Morality of Function 1–4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard
Law Library).
26. See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 67 (providing a series of questions
about a case problem under the subheading “The Problem from an Olympian
Point of View” and concluding that “[a]ll the rest of these materials are designed
to cast light on the questions under this last subheading”).
27. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You Better Believe it, 25 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFS. 87 (1996) (denying the possibility of attaining an “Archimedean
point” that “stand[s] outside a whole body of belief, and to judge it as a whole
from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it”). Cf. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
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it seems, at the very least, to encourage lawyers to think that
they can do philosophy—or economics or sociology or
psychology—without bothering to ensure competency in
those fields. Such an attitude reflects what Mark Tushnet
calls the “lawyer as astrophysicist” assumption, according to
which the “generalist training of lawyers allows any lawyer
to read a text on astrophysics over the weekend and launch
a rocket on Monday.”28 If anything like that assumption was
ever justified, so this objection goes, it no longer is.29
But I think this misunderstands what Henry was trying
to achieve in asking students to try to imagine such a
perspective. He was not assuming that one could actually
achieve a perspective-less perspective. Rather, he was
emphasizing that lawyers are constantly put in situations
where they have to make a decision one way or another—
whether to grant a plaintiff’s motion, whether to take a
party’s case, whether (and if so, how) to make an argument
in court, whether (and if so, how) to enforce a legislative
command—even though it may be far from clear what the
best decision would be. This is even true—it is especially
true—when the decision is about whose facts to believe, what
authority to trust, or to which institution to defer.30
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960 271 (1992) (criticizing “the 1950s
search for ‘neutral principles’” as expressing a “yearning to find an Olympian
position from which to objectively cushion the terrors of social choice”).
28. Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation
of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1338 n.140
(1979).
29. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 763 (1987) (observing that the confidence in
law’s “autonomy as a discipline” was “empirically supported” at the time Posner
was in law school).
30. See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 112 (“The further examination of the
nature of the process of institutional decision, and of the problems involved in
making and appraising the decisions in each of the major types of institutional
processes [e.g., adjudication, voting, etc.], is the concern of these materials from
this beginning to the end.”); id. at 149 (explaining that “there may be thought to
be a justification for describing [a magistrate’s] act of interpretation as one of
discretion . . . . But this would be obscure what seems to be the vital point—
namely, the effort, and the importance of the effort, of each individual deciding
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Deliberating about such questions requires looking at them
from different angles and then coming to a judgment about
what to believe and what to do.31
Under this view, far from being a condition for practical
reasoning, the lawyer’s aspiration to achieve the “Olympian”
perspective is simply the perspective that is entailed by
whatever decision she ends up making. It is the goal, not the
starting point; the conclusion, not the premise.32 And if
seeking such a perspective counts as “philosophy,” then legal
practice is inescapably philosophical. So understood, the
aspiration reflects not so much Henry’s faith in the
intellectual prowess of his students as it did his insistence on
their ultimate moral responsibility for their decisions. As
Henry put it elsewhere, “[m]an learns wisdom in choosing by
being confronted with choices and by being made aware that
he must abide the consequences of his choice.”33
II.
If explaining Henry’s theory in terms of Herbert’s cannot
make sense of what Henry actually wrote, how about the
reverse? What if we explained Herbert’s theory in terms of
Henry’s? That is exactly what I’d like to do. Doing so,
however, first requires understanding the philosophical
traditions in which each of the two Harts was operating.
Then we can see how interpreting their work in light of those

officer to reach what he thinks is the right answer”).
31. Id. at 110 (“[T[he conclusions of the science [of society] must depend
ultimately upon judgment—upon judgment informed by experience and by all the
objective data that can feasibly be assembled, but upon judgment nevertheless.
The chief business of a student of the science, therefore, is to train his
judgment.”).
32. Id. at 67 (explaining that “[a]ll the rest of these materials are designed to
cast light on the questions under [the subheading ‘The Problem from the
Olympian Point of View’]” but clarifying that “[t]he questions are put at this point
to invite reflection and not with any thought that what has so far been presented
makes possible a confident answer”).
33. HART, supra note 2, at 410.
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traditions might revise the conventional reading of Herbert’s
great work.
The two Harts worked in quite different intellectual
traditions. Whereas Herbert was immersed in the ordinarylanguage philosophy that dominated Oxford at the time,
Henry was operating within a legal tradition deeply
influenced by American pragmatism.34 Let me say a few—
inevitably crude and over-simplified—words about each of
these philosophical traditions.
Both traditions developed as an effort to solve the same
philosophical problem, though they did so in different ways.
The problem is how to reconcile our commonsense experience
of the world with the image of the world delivered by modern
science. In our everyday lives, concepts like knowledge,
mind, agency, meaning, and value make sense and have
significance for us. But from the perspective of science or, as
Thomas Nagel puts it, the “view from nowhere,” it is not clear
how they can attach to anything in the physical world; it is
hard to know where to place them or, therefore, how to make
sense of them.35 So when it comes to understanding those
critical concepts, which ought we trust, our “subjective”
experience of the world or the “objective” description of the
world offered by science? We can call this philosophical
problem the Essential Dilemma.

34. I have discussed both in previous work. See Forgotten Foundations, supra
note 5, at 2–25 (discussing influence of William James and Roscoe Pound on
Hart); Inside-Out, supra note 5, at 1213 (discussing influence of Gilbert Ryle, J.
L. Austin and other linguistic philosophers on Hart); see also Leslie Green,
“Introduction to The Concept of Law,” in HART, supra note 4, at xlvii (same).
35. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 3 (1986) (“This book is
about a single problem: how to combine the perspective of a particular person
inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the person and his
viewpoint included.”). Philosophers today sometimes refer to this as the
“placement problem.” See David Macarthur & Huw Price, Pragmatism, QuasiRealism, and the Global Challenge, in NEW PRAGMATISTS 93–95 (Cheryl Misak
ed., 2007); see also Charles L. Barzun, Metaphysical Quietism and Functional
Explanation in Law, 34 L. & PHIL. 89, 92 (2015) (discussing and criticizing
Macarthur and Price’s solution to the placement problem).
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Both traditions took this dilemma seriously in one sense:
neither thought that opting for one horn of it was an
acceptable route. We cannot abandon the empiricist methods
that have produced so much knowledge about, and
technological progress in, the world; but nor can we dismiss
talk of human value as meaningless.36 In this way, both
responses rejected extreme forms of idealism or rationalism,
on the one hand, and materialism and empiricism, on the
other.37 Both insisted that another path must be found.
But the two traditions differed as to how they forged that
alternative path. Ordinary-language philosophers sought to
defuse or deflate the dilemma by suggesting that it only
arises from confusions produced by our language. To use
Gilbert Ryle’s example, we say that “minds exist,” and that
“bodies exist.” But we fail to see that when we do so we mean
different things by “exist,” just as, when we say “the tide is
rising” and “hopes are rising,” we use the same word to refer
to two distinct relations. Both are intelligible uses of the
term, but they carry different meanings, depending on what
we are trying to do or say in any particular context.38 So
understood, the mind-body problem (which is one instance of
the Essential Dilemma) is revealed to be what Ryle called a
“category mistake”—falsely thinking, for example, that
“mind” belongs to the same category of phenomena that
bodies do. Such a way of thinking reflects, in Ryle’s famous
phrase, “the dogma of the ghost in the machine.” Under this
view, then, the Essential Dilemma is a kind of illusion that,
once revealed as such, dissolves away, leaving only the

36. That was the view associated with logical positivism. See, e.g., ALFRED
JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 38–39 (2d ed. 1946) (“[I]t is the mark
of a genuine factual proposition . . . that some experiential propositions can be
deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being
deducible from those other premises alone.”).
37. Technically, idealism and materialism refer to metaphysical theses, while
rationalism and empiricism refer to epistemological ones, but the pairs tend to
travel together.
38. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949).
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particulars of linguistic usage for philosophers to study and
analyze with precision.
The pragmatist path—or at least the one forged by the
particular strand of pragmatism that I’m tempted to call the
existentialist strand—took a very different approach.39
Rather than claiming that neither horn need be chosen
because the dilemma itself arises from confusion, it suggests
that both horns can be—indeed, must be—chosen. The
reason is that our theoretical reasoning (about what there is
in the world) is both driven by practical concerns (about what
matters, what is good) and is (therefore) properly evaluated
by reference to practical criteria.40 Under this view, then,
“minds” exist in the world if (and only if) our theories that
treat them as real work well for us, enabling us to create a
world that has meaning and value for us.41 As William James
put it, the whole notion of “truth” is “essentially bound up
with the way in which one moment in our experience may
lead us towards other moments which it will be worthwhile
to have been led to.”42 So, according to this view, the
Essential Dilemma is very real, but we resolve it for
ourselves every time we make a decision about what to
believe or what to do.
We can see, then, that the two traditions advance nearly
opposite approaches to resolving the dilemma without opting
for one horn or the other. According to the first, the dilemma
just reflects a linguistic confusion, so neither horn need be (or
39. It is a strand I associate most closely with William James. See Forgotten
Foundations, supra note 5, at 22–25. Others have noted the similarity between
James’s views and those of European existentialist philosophers. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM BARRETT, IRRATIONAL MAN 18–19 (1958) (“Of all the non-European
philosophers, William James probably best deserves to be labeled an
Existentialist. . . . There are pages in James that could have been written by
Kierkegaard”).
40. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF
THINKING 203 (1907) (“The possession of truth, so far from being here an end in
itself, is only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions.”).
41. See id. at 204.
42. Id. at 204–05.
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ought to be) chosen. According to the second, the dilemma is
inescapable and yet irresolvable, so that, in some sense, both
must be chosen.
Arguably, neither of these responses is satisfying, in part
because each could be seen as effectively choosing one horn
of the original dilemma after all. The linguistic philosophers
essentially treat the dilemma as a theoretical one,
susceptible to traditional philosophical analysis and in no
way threatening to modern science. Linguistic usage is
simply treated as a form of human behavior capable of being
observed and analyzed like any other behavior.43 But if so,
then one is still left with a question: when we analyze how
people use ethical terms, are we learning something about
ethics or just about how (some) people talk about ethics?
Unless it’s the former, we have not really escaped the
dilemma, and yet going that route seemed to invite the kind
of metaphysical worries that originally prompted the
dilemma.
Meantime, the pragmatist treats the dilemma as a
practical one that constantly demands choices about what to
do (and, therefore, judgments about what there is). That is
so because, under this view, questions about what to believe
are inevitably answered (and properly so) by reference to
practical considerations. Yet, this solution fails to do justice
to the deep epistemic intuitions that lead to the dilemma in
the first place. It seems hard to shake the thought that there
is a difference in principle between some fact or theory being
true and it being useful, or valuable, or fit for a better world,
however defined. And yet, taken literally, the pragmatist
approach seems to leave such a difference unintelligible.
If the above analysis is correct, then the Essential
Dilemma just recurs in a slightly modified, second-order
form: is the problem of reconciling our commonsense

43. Julia Tanney, Rethinking Ryle: A Critical Discussion of The Concept of
Mind, in THE CONCEPT OF MIND, at xxii-xxiii (Gilbert Ryle ed., 2009) (noting the
criticism of Ryle’s work that it amounts to a defense of behaviorism).

2021]

THE TALE OF TWO HARTS

25

“subjective” experience with “objective” methods of gaining
knowledge a theoretical problem about what to believe there
is in the world or is it a practical problem about what to do?
And the same kinds of responses could be offered: It is
neither because it arises from a confusion (ordinary
philosophy), or it is both because every decision one makes is
a decision that reflects practical and theoretical
commitments (pragmatism). Infinite regress looms.
Now let’s get back to law and legal theory. As the title of
his book indicates, Herbert opted for the same route as his
fellow Oxford linguistic philosophers.44 As it relates to law,
the Essential Dilemma poses the question of whether law is
best understood as an element of practical reasoning
(natural law) or is simply a brute fact (positivism). We can
now see that Herbert’s distinction between two “points of
view” is just the linguistic philosophers’ approach to
resolving that dilemma.45 Those who take the internal point
of view, use words like “ought” and “should” and so treat the
rule of recognition as a rational standard or criterion for legal
validity. But others may take the “external” point of view and
so treat such rules as only indicators of behavioral
regularities.46 Just as with Ryle, one can make an existence
claim from both points of view, but when they are made, each
means something different by saying that the law “is” X.
From the internal point of view, such a statement implies a
normative judgment about what a person to whom the rule
applies ought to do (“rules passed by Congress and the signed
by the President must be enforced as law”); from the
external, a merely factual one about official behavior (“judges

44. Compare Gilbert Ryle, THE CONCEPT OF MIND, with H. L. A. Hart, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW. See also Green, supra note 34.
45. But see Green, supra note 34, at xlvii (observing that, despite the influence
of Ryle and Austin on Hart, “what is most striking, given its vintage and
provenance, is how little linguistic analysis there is in the Concept of Law”).
46. HART, supra note 4, at 89.
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tend to treat as law rules passed by Congress and signed by
the President”).47
Henry, meanwhile, took the (existentialist) pragmatist’s
approach. He, too, recognized that from the perspective of a
social scientist, one could look at the American legal system
as a natural scientist would look at the behavior of an
amoeba.48 But rather than simply treating that as another,
equally valid, “external” point of view with respect to the
foundational rules of the legal system, he sought to reconcile
and combine such a scholarly perspective with that of a
lawyer practicing law, whether as an advocate, a legislator,
judge, or executive officer. That meant that the choice of
research methods was itself an ethical choice, as judged at
least in part by what the effect of taking such a view might
be.49 According to Henry, all such lawyers were concerned
with what the teaching materials call the “science of society,”
namely the field of knowledge related to institutional
processes of social decision-making.50 Such a science, in his
view, was partly empirical, partly normative. Hence, the
teaching materials repeatedly refer to law as a “prudential”
or “judgmatical” science.51
With these considerations in mind, we can now pose the
thought experiment mentioned at the outset. What would it
look like to explain Herbert’s legal theory in the terms of
Henry’s? The answer, I think, is that, under Henry’s
approach, The Concept of Law is revealed to be a work of
profound ambivalence as to the power of law to compel
obedience. Why? Well, under Henry’s pragmatist view, both
law and legal theory are properly guided by, and subject to
evaluation by reference to, practical criteria (about what to

47. Id.
48. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 108.
49. I offer more textual support for this claim in Barzun, supra note 5.
50. Id. at 107.
51. Id.

2021]

THE TALE OF TWO HARTS

27

do). And yet, the relevant practical implications of Herbert’s
theory cut in opposite directions.
On the one hand, Herbert wants to suggest (just as
Henry did) that having generally recognized procedures for
generating and identifying some rule as “law” is inherently
valuable insofar as such procedures offer a means for the
peaceful resolution of social conflict.52 If that is so, then a
norm’s status as “legally valid” would seem to be at least
relevant to, even if not dispositive on, the question of
whether it deserves obedience. And indeed, Herbert
sometimes says things that imply exactly that, such as in the
passage quoted above.53
On the other hand, though, Herbert insists that whether
something counts as law is, from the “external” perspective,
entirely a factual question about the behavior of officials—
namely, which rules they treat as legally valid. The views of
the people actually living under those rules are irrelevant.
As Hart says, those people’s attitudes can be “deplorably
sheeplike” and “the sheep can end up in the
slaughterhouse.”54 That view can explain why the Nazis had
“law,” but it does so at the cost of explaining why judges or
citizens would have even a prima facie obligation to treat
such law as compelling any obedience whatsoever.55
52. HART, supra note 4, at 94–98 (explaining how the introduction of
secondary rules of recognition “remedy” the “defects” of a system with only
primary rules of obligation).
53. See supra, p.18 and text accompanying note 52; HART, supra note 4, at
210.
54. Id. at 117.
55. I understand Lon Fuller to have been making a similar criticism of an
earlier version of Hart’s argument when he complained that the “dilemma” that
Hart suggests, an unjust law, presents the citizen with the following: “[t]he verbal
formulation of a problem, but the problem it states makes no sense. It is like
saying I have to choose between giving food to a starving man and being mimsy
with the borogoves.” Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 656 (1957). I should note here that more or
less everything I say in this Essay about Henry Hart’s philosophical ambitions
could also be said of Fuller’s, a fact which may bear on how one should understand
the so-called Hart-Fuller debate.
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Interestingly, Herbert’s biographer has concluded that
Hart experienced anxiety over precisely this tension. After
examining Herbert’s notebooks, Nicola Lacey observes that
he “struggled with the concept of legal obligation” and that
he hoped that his concept of legal obligation “would be the
linchpin of his delicate middle way between Realism or crude
positivism and natural law.”56 That middle way was enabled
by his division between two “points of view,” one “internal”
and normative and the other “external” and sociological. But
ultimately, Lacey concludes, “Herbert was never convinced
that he had satisfactorily resolved this dilemma about the
restricted, but genuinely normative, notion of obligation in
law.”57
He was not the only one. Henry, too, was unconvinced by
his own effort to reconcile fact and value—to accommodate
both scientific and moral knowledge. But he dealt with the
issue, and the problem it presented for him, more openly and
directly. When he was invited to be the first Harvard Faculty
member to give the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures in 1963,
Henry entitled his lectures “Conversations about Law and
Justice.”58 They took the form of an imagined Socratic
dialogue between Henry and a second-year law student with
“an undergraduate education in behavioral political science.”
In the first lecture, he put these words in his fictitious and
skeptical student: “I’m having trouble getting my bearings in
the law. What really troubles me is not so much the question
of the nature of law, but the question of knowledge about it.
How do we connect the law and what we know about law with
the way things are in the world?”59

56. LACEY, supra note 8, at 228.
57. Id.
58. Michael J. Henry, Hart Converses on Law and Justice, 36 HARV. L. REC.
7–8 (1963).
59. Id. Cf. David Plunkett and Scott Shapiro, Law, Morality, and Everything
Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry, 128 ETHICS
37, 44 (2017) (defining general jurisprudence as a form of “metalegal inquiry”
which “aims to explain how legal thought, talk, and reality fit into reality”).
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Ultimately, Henry was never able to answer that
question to his own satisfaction. By some reports, he
abruptly ended his final lecture, having declared that he had
failed in his endeavor. But in the process, he made clear that
for him, recognizing the inherent difficulty of the problem
was part of the solution. He did so by wondering aloud what
it would be like if “ethical philosophers by purely secular
reasoning were able to tell us with ruthless scientific
exactitude just what it means for things and actions to be
good.”60 In a passage worth quoting in full, he explained why
he considered this possibility more a nightmare than dream:
All that would be left for Man would be to summon the power of
will to do what the ethical philosophers told him to do. What then
would become of human dignity and the responsibility upon which
human dignity rests? It is the mission of Man on earth to try to find
out about these things for himself, or else to make his peace with
God and to accept the basic principles upon faith.61

In short, the anxiety Herbert reserved for his diary,
Henry made a central pillar of his legal and social
philosophy.
III.
The difference just identified between the two Harts
bears on the question of law’s status as a “discipline” of
knowledge and its relation to other disciplines. It does so
because their contrasting responses to the Essential
Dilemma correspond to two different ways of understanding
the nature of disciplinary knowledge itself. Because Schlegel
has himself long chafed against one of these ways of
understanding it, his thoughts on the subjects of law, history,
and disciplinary knowledge will usefully illuminate the
contrast.
It is not too hard to see that the academic division of
labor, entrenched in the modern university and often
60. Henry, supra note 58, at 7.
61. Id.
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replicated within law schools, offers the same strategy for
resolving the Essential Dilemma that Herbert did: divide
and defuse. What is the distinction between “internal” and
“external” points of view other than an erection of a
disciplinary boundary in generic form? Sure, from the
perspective of lawyers and judges, and the legal scholars who
write for them (or a constructed version of them), the
foundational criteria of legal validity in our society carries
normative weight. But to “external” historians or to political
scientists who study the legal system in their official capacity
they are just brute facts about how people speak and behave
about certain things and are thus of no intrinsic moral
significance. So who is right: Does marking something as
“law” constitute an evaluative judgment, or merely a factual
one? Well, it depends on whom you ask.
It is but a short step from such logic to a more global
approach that sees each of the various disciplines as offering
different “perspectives” on legal practice, each contributing
something interesting but inoffensive and unthreatening to
others. Everyone is kept contented so long as everyone else
sticks to their own turf. The handful of academics who call
themselves “legal philosophers” can argue endlessly about
the “nature” of law. But no need to bother with that question
ourselves; better that we get along and get on with our own
thing.62
But that response, as we have seen, treats the Essential
Dilemma as a purely theoretical one. For Henry, it was
practical as well. That is why he thought it an evasion of
responsibility to relegate the study and evaluation of law to
other disciplines.63 Law, in his view, was a craft that required
learning how legal institutions, from courts to legislatures to
agencies to regimes of contract, worked and one that
62. Elsewhere I have described (and criticized) this sort of view as “quietist.”
See Barzun, supra note 35, at 89.
63. See Henry, supra note 57, at 7 (“However, law too, [Professor Hart] noted,
has been dogged by the idea of rooting itself in the facts and letting some other
discipline take the responsibility for the evaluations”).
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demanded techniques for maintaining and improving those
institutions.64 It is at once practical and theoretical. Often
lawyers must defer to experts, or to some other institutional
authority, but identifying the circumstances in which that is
true itself requires understanding and judgment.
Under this view, then, law is not simply a social
institution that can be viewed from the “inside” by the actors
who work within it as well as from the “outside” by social
scientists who take it as an object of study.65 Rather, it is
itself a “science of society” that strives to make use of the
best, even if inevitably incomplete and uncertain, knowledge
we have of the world in order to resolve various forms of
social and political conflict. It is this ambition to see law as a
way of simultaneously thinking about and engaging in the
world—in other words, law as a “prudential science”—that is
obscured when we treat legal-process theory through the lens
of Herbert’s internal/external dichotomy.
This ambition, to see law as craft and a way of thinking
about the world, is a capacious one that can take many forms.
Schlegel is proof of that. There is irony, of course, in
suggesting that Schlegel is an heir to Henry’s philosophical
approach. Not only was Schlegel part of the Critical Legal
Studies movement, one of whose central targets was the
legal-process school of Hart and his contemporaries,66 but
64. Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 113 (explaining that “speaking
intelligibly and sensibly to the future” is one of the techniques “at the heart of
the lawyer’s craft”).
65. That may be because law is not like a circle or box, with an inside and
outside, but rather a mobius strip or Klein Bottle, which is a three-dimensional
shape with only one side. See John Henry Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar
Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435, 450 (1989) (suggesting that these shapes are
better metaphors than a circle for the “hermeneutic circle”). For an illustration of
a “Klein Bottle,” see Appendix.
66. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976) (explaining that one of the two
primary theses of his article is to vindicate the intuition that “substantive and
formal conflict in private law cannot be reduced to disagreement about how to
apply some neutral calculus that will ‘maximize the total satisfactions of valid
human wants’”) (quoting and citing HART & SACKS, supra note 4).
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Schlegel is himself no fan of Henry’s. I base that judgment
primarily on conversations we have had about legal-process
theory, as well as the copy of the teaching materials that
Schlegel had marked up when a student, which he sent me
once when I was working on an article about them. In the
margin next to the paragraph about constitutive
arrangements of a society being “obviously more
fundamental” than the substantive arrangements—
arguably the core assumption of the entire set of teaching
materials and legal-process theory as a whole—Schlegel had
written just one word: “Nonsense.” As a law-school student,
Schlegel found the portrait those materials offered of the
legal system to bear little if any resemblance to how legal
power was actually exerted by real human beings living in
cities and towns across the country.67
But the resemblance is real. Consider a recent essay of
Schlegel’s, published in this law review.68 In that essay, he
describes the difficulty with which he is confronted by
teaching at a time when students have no sense of what it
means to be cultivated in the arts of lawyering. “[S]tudents,”
Schlegel observes, “do not appear to equate wanting to be a
lawyer with wanting to be a good lawyer—a skillful lawyer,
a successful lawyer, a winning lawyer, a decent and ethical
lawyer, a lawyer who knows the craft.”69 That fact is
lamentable to Schlegel because even though, like flipping
burgers, the job of most lawyers is often tedious, it remains
true that “perhaps once a month a lawyer may face a problem
that cannot be handled by resort to the formulaic responses
and the boilerplate that lawyer has deployed a hundred

67. Actually, that’s somewhat of an understatement: “Indeed, I think it is
shitty, politically repressive, contrary to what I see as the point to an education—
giving one a purchase on the world so that one may try to choose, or in default
make, one’s place in it—and generally cowardly, in that it avoids explicit
justification of social practices.” John Henry Schlegel, A Certain Narcissism; A
Slight Unseemliness, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 595, 607 (1992).
68. Schlegel, supra note 3.
69. Id. at 453.
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times before.” In such circumstances, “[j]udgment, craft,
creativity, and even wit occasionally may be found highly
useful, even if not strictly required.”70
Schlegel sees his job as a law teacher to lie, at least in
part, in trying to get his students to develop such good
judgment. He cannot develop it for them; it is something they
must do for themselves. And it requires them to do more than
merely master written material, whether in the form of
cases, academic commentary, or anything else. Developing a
sense of good lawyerly judgment requires “close, laborious,
critical reading of texts; careful and self-critical reflection.”71
It demands “critical thinking” in the sense that it requires
one to engage with the world from a skeptical posture. This
act involves, in Schlegel’s words, “reading against (and
sometimes across) the grain, whether the grain is that of
written materials, understandings of human behavior, or of
human institutions in an attempt to gain a different
perspective.”72
But skepticism does not mean critique for its own sake.
It is just as bad to apply some stock theoretical lens—
whether Marxist or Freudian or some other, more
fashionable “theory”—to, say, a judicial opinion than it would
be to apply a doctrinal filter that strips away everything but
the application of a rule to a set of facts.73 Both would be
“inimical to critical thought” because in neither case is the
reader’s mind allowed the sort of free play necessary for
genuine insight.
Nor does such insight involve the mere discovery of
something out in the world. Rather, it emerges from a
complex interplay of mind and world.74 The inquiry thus
70. Id. at 454.
71. Id. at 455
72. Id. at 455 n. 14.
73. Id.
74. Schlegel, supra note 65, at 443 (endorsing the view that “the mind has a
constitutive role that it plays in perception,” so that “[w]hat the subject perceives
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involves not a small amount of “exploring the content of one’s
own head,” in a way that most law students do not quite
grasp.75
Another way to put the point would be to say that good
judgment, or prudence, is an ethical as well as an intellectual
virtue. That means human responsibility takes center
stage.76 Exercising judgment in legal practice will require
Schlegel’s students to “put[] their butt on the line, by
exercising the best possible judgment in circumstances
where answers are unlikely and advice only possible in terms
of better or worse alternatives.”77 And that means accepting
responsibility when things don’t work out as planned: “A
lawyer who exercises judgment accepts the risk that the
advice given will be less than optimum, even wrong, and so
accepts the blame that follows from poor judgment.”78 In
short, like Henry, Schlegel sees law as a “prudential” science
of sorts.
Of course, Schlegel’s vision of what a good legal
education actually looks like is not the same as Henry’s. Far
from it.79 In a symposium from the early 1990s, Schlegel
imagined a law school based on books “about law”—or offered
from an “external” (his quotes) perspective on the legal
system80—the aim of which would be to teach students “the
regularities in what lawyers do across practice specialties
and, if well done, across legal regimes.” It would offer courses
on “the structure of the legal profession or on the economic

‘out there’ is not what is ‘really’ out there, but only what the mind is somehow
‘able’ to see”).
75. Schlegel, supra note 3, at 455.
76. See cf. Ralph McInerny and John O’Callaghan, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (“Prudence is an intellectual virtue
since it bears upon the goal of truth in the good ordering of action.”).
77. Schlegel, supra note 3, at 453.
78. Id. at 464.
79. See Schlegel, supra note 67, at 609 (treating Hart as a foil).
80. Id. at 607.
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and social system in which it is embedded.”81 Such a law
school, Schlegel argued, would offer students a better legal
education because it would give them a more theoretical
perspective, thereby offering them intellectual “tools with
which to work for the duration of an honorable professional
life.”82 This is not your father’s Legal Process course.
But that’s just the point.83 Because we live in Herbert’s
world, Schlegel’s idea of training lawyers using materials
that look at law from such an “external” perspective is
difficult to even make sense of. Hardly surprising, then, that
Robert Post concluded in a comment in the same symposium
that Schlegel’s effort to use “external” scholarship for the
sake of improving legal education and practice, rendered him
“paralyzed, half in and half out of the traditional legal
academy.”84 Post saw Schlegel as caught in a “self-defeating
tension.”
That seems exactly half right. It’s certainly a tension.
But although that tension can be uncomfortable, it need not
be self-defeating. Recall that in the pragmatist view, the
Essential Dilemma is just part of the human condition,
unresolvable in the abstract and yet inescapable in
particulars. So understood, facing it can lead to productive
and creative thought. Jerome Frank called it a posture of
“painful suspension,” which he thought critical for
intellectual advance.85 Schlegel once described it to me, in
discussing the CLS movement, as a “vibration” that those in
the CLS movement experienced—one between their deep

81. Id. at 604.
82. Id. at 607.
83. A point I have made before. See Barzun, supra note 5, at 1283–85.
84. Robert Post, Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 615, 622 (1992).
85. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 172–73 (1963) (endorsing, and
ascribing to Hans Vaihinger, the view that the most advanced (but least
comfortable) stage of human development is one in which “it is recognized that
although thought may not be in complete correspondence with factual reality, it
may lead to ultimate practical coincidence with the facts of existence”).
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moral convictions and their equally deep doubts as to how
they could ever rationally justify those convictions.86
Under this view, then, we would see Schlegel’s imagined
law school as simply a rival hypothesis as to what particular
habits, skills, methods and ideas are properly cultivated in
law students. We would test that hypothesis in the only way
possible—by trying it out and comparing its fruits against
those of the traditional methods, for the students, for legal
practice, and for society. That is no easy task because it
would require those teaching such courses to have the
courage of their convictions and to preach (in class) what
they practice (in their scholarship). It was precisely
Schlegel’s lack of confidence in the typical CLS scholar’s will
or capacity to do so that made him skeptical of the likelihood
of such a law school actually coming into existence.
Professor Post may have worried (and perhaps Henry
would have as well) that such an approach, if adopted
pervasively, would threaten the very existence of the legal
order, shaking students’ faith in the reality, and therefore
value, of the “rule of law.” But for his part, Schlegel thought
the legal system could handle it. “[C]ontrary to most of my
intellectual friends,” he explained, “I think the law would
likely survive such criticism.”87 The reason, at least in part,
is that books “about law” are just as vulnerable to skeptical
doubts as is mainstream legal practice and theory.
This last point leads to yet another example where we
can see the same creative tension at work. Take Schlegel’s
view of legal history, a field to which he himself has made
significant contributions.88 Schlegel has long insisted that
intellectual history would be improved by treating it as a
“history of intellectuals,” rather than one of ideas.89 Now, the
86. Whether Schlegel’s is an idiosyncratic account of CLS I cannot say.
87. Schlegel, supra note 67, at 607.
88. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE (2011).
89. See, e.g., Schlegel, supra note 65, at 435; see also id., at 453–67.
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suggestion that one can only understand ideas from the past
by examining the social context in which they arose in some
ways reflects (again) the belief in the interdependence of
facts and values, objective and subjective, theoretical and
practical reasoning that marks the pragmatist tradition to
which I have suggested both Schlegel and Henry belong.90 It
is also more or less conventional wisdom today among legal
and intellectual historians generally, many of whom have
used it as a basis for undermining the doctrines and concepts
of legal practice by revealing its historical contingency.91
But what makes Schlegel stand apart is that he is
equally concerned to make the same point about the
historians themselves. For him, such contextualized
accounts and contingency-exposing critiques do not offer
“true” accounts of legal practice or (therefore) a secure basis
from which to issue a final verdict on legal practice. After all,
those accounts can be contextualized, and the contingency of
those critiques can be exposed, in precisely the same manner.
Historians are intellectuals, too. As Schlegel recently put it,
in typically colorful language, “[w]e are always trapped by
our past and our present, by our race and ethnicity, our
gender and sexual orientation, our education and class
position, our toilet training and other rebellions.”92 This fact
does not undermine historical inquiry; instead, it gives us a
reason to celebrate it:
90. See, e.g., James T. Kloppenberg, Thinking Historically: A Manifesto of
Pragmatic Hermeneutics, 9 MOD. INT. HIST. 201, 202 (2012) (“Every text must be
studied in relation to its author or authors, particular persons existing in a
particular time and place, and interpreted as the embodiment of a particular set
of practices and purposes.”).
91. For an example in the legal domain, see MARK GRABER, TRANSFORMING
FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991) (drawing
on the work of Quentin Skinner to contextualize, and criticize the “social interest”
justification for protecting free speech). Charles L. Barzun, Politics or Principle?
Zechariah Chafee and the Social Interest in Free Speech, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259,
269 (criticizing Graber’s account).
92. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, SEZ WHO? CRITICAL LEGAL HISTORY WITHOUT A
PRIVILEGED POSITION IN OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 578
(Markus D. Dubber & Christopher Tomlins, eds. Oxford University Press 2018).
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[B]eing trapped does not mean that we have no obligation to do our
very best to understand the many worlds of the people in our
various stories about the past. We need to understand, and not in
caricature, simultaneously both the workers and the capitalists, the
feminists and the misogynists, the racists and the objects of their
vilification. This is not because their beliefs and actions are of equal
value—our writing ultimately discloses how we value them, as it
should—but because they are all humans, all trapped in their past
and present just as we historians are.93

If Schlegel’s view about the limits of our own knowledge
is right, then it’s a lot harder to launch devastating
critiques—at least in the short run—because the ground
from which one launches the attack is always vulnerable to
crumbling underneath.94
The point can be generalized. Some of those sympathetic
to CLS-style critiques tend to fetishize other disciplines,
seeing them as sources of purer forms of knowledge,
uncorrupted by the professional pressures that distort
scholarly efforts and produce “law-office history.”95 Schlegel,
though, recognizes that scholars in all fields are susceptible
to institutional and professional pressures, rendering their
perspectives on legal practice just as partial and potentially
distorted as those of lawyers and law professors. Academics,
too, have bills to pay, promotions to secure, and thus,
intellectual turf to protect.96

93. Id. at 578.
94. Id. (answering “no” to the question, which he attributes to Barry
Cushman, “Can you name a successful critical reform movement that devoted a
lot of effort to analyzing and critiquing its own animating foundational
assumptions?”).
95. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities:
An Uneasy Relationship, 18 Yale J. L. & Human. 155, 165 (2006) (defining “lawoffice history” as the mining of a historical record to support one’s own legal
conclusion).
96. John Henry Schlegel, If the Music Hadn’t Stopped, or Reflections on the
Great Kerfuffle: Historicism’s Continuing Grasp for Truth, YALE J. L. & HUMAN.
(forthcoming, 2020) (manuscript at 3) (on file with authors) (observing in the rise
of academic disciplines in the early 20th century, “[e]ach group began by staking
out part of the intellectual world as its ‘turf,’ adopting a particular way of looking
at that turf, a method as it were, and moving to cut out the ‘amateurs’ who
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To make such observations is not to indict the integrity
of other disciplines. It is merely to recognize that writing and
teaching in history, literature, philosophy, political science,
psychology, economics, or anything else is its own sort of
craft, which involves not only mastering certain sources and
methods but also expressing judgments about what does and
does not matter. “In the classroom, if not elsewhere,”
Schlegel points out, “a teacher is implicitly making a
representation that whatever material is transmitted to
one’s students is something worth acquiring, something
worth paying for.”97 True, we can say that such
representations reflect the “internal” point of view of
whatever discipline is being taught. And so they do. But such
a statement does not answer the question of whether the
disciplinary perspective itself—its methods, materials, and
assumptions—are worthwhile ones.
That is why Schlegel sympathizes with Paul
Carrington’s suggestion in 1984 that CLS scholars should
resign their posts in law schools.98 True, Carrington was
wrong on the merits, because he profoundly misunderstood
what CLS scholars believed and were arguing for (he had
mistakenly thought them nihilists).99 He was right, though,
to underscore the inescapably ethical component of the
scholarly debate over CLS. “For a scholar who understood
that it is not possible to establish the Truth of scholarship,”
Schlegel recognizes, “Carrington’s proposition has more
bite.”100 That is because they see that what they write and
teach as an expression of who they are and what they value.
Which is all just to say that what is true for the law
student preparing for practice is also true for the law
professor, teacher, and scholar. As Lon Fuller, a
formerly had a claim to that turf”).
97. Id. at 20.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 20–21.
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contemporary and friend of both Harts, put it, the only gospel
for both groups is that “there is no gospel that will save us
from the pain of deciding at every step.”101 To raise a
question, to treat it as worthy of investigation, and to devote
one’s time to investigating it are all simultaneously decisions
about what to do and what to believe.
***
But why think that the “pain” (or Schlegel’s “vibration”)
that facing the Essential Dilemma head-on produces is more
likely to bear fruit than result in self-defeat? Here I offer no
argument. The thought that it will, I think, rests on a kind
of faith. The hope is that by confronting (rather than evading
through an intellectual division of labor) the felt
contradictions in our deeply held beliefs—tensions between
and among our most deeply held moral convictions and
epistemic commitments—we can somehow gain insight and
understanding.102 That means, as it applies to law, that it is
a faith which underlies both (1) the ambition to conceive of
law as an “autonomous discipline” and (2) the refusal to
accept as final the particular and contingent way that the
modern academy has carved up intellectual life and
packaged it for progress. And it is a faith exhibited by those
who strive mightily (even if unsuccessfully) to reconcile those
contradictions (as Henry did) and those who proceed in full,
conscious awareness of the impossibility of doing so (as

101. Lon L. Fuller, The Place and Uses of Jurisprudence in the Law School
Curriculum, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495, 507 (1949).
102. Cf. NAGEL, supra note 35, at 4 (“Certain forms of perplexity—for example,
about freedom, knowledge, and the meaning of life—seem to me to embody more
insight than any of the supposed solutions to those problems.”). Cf. Schlegel,
supra note 92, at 578–89 (“As a utopian I believe that when not in a Maoist mode,
self-criticism would more fully reflect the position that scholars, especially the
historians whose work I know and love, are in when and whatever they write.
And I hope that such more capacious reflection on the limitations of positionality
just might allow our critique to be effective for more than the statutory fifteen
minutes of Warholian fame.”).
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Schlegel does).103
If those seem like strange, perhaps even paradoxical,
pairings, then consider one final point. Although throughout
this Essay I’ve described this posture towards the Essential
Dilemma as “pragmatist,” another label would be humanist.
That term is a contested one, and I will not defend here either
my use of it, or the implication that law properly belongs to
the “humanities.” Suffice it to say that the spirit intended is
well captured by Leonard Cohen in his lyrics that Schlegel
quotes in a different, though I think related, context:
There’s a crack, a crack in everything. That’s how the
light gets in.104

103. Cf. Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank, Lon Fuller, and a Romantic
Pragmatism, 29 YALE J. LAW & HUMAN. 101, 129 (2017) (making an analogous,
perhaps even identical, claim about two other legal thinkers not typically classed
together).
104. LEONARD COHEN, ANTHEM (Columbia Records 1992). See Schlegel, supra
note 3, at 472.
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APPENDIX: Klein Bottle (shape with only one side)

